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Abstract
In this paper, using a production framework in which skilled and unskilled labor
are imperfect substitutes, we analyze the time paths of the e±ciencies of skilled and
unskilled labor and their implications for wage inequality and economic growth. We
¯nd no evidence that supports the common view that there has been an acceleration in
skilled biased technical change. Indeed, after 1973 the e±ciency of skilled labor grew
more slowly than it had from 1961 to 1973. More interestingly, we ¯nd that after 1973
there has been a substantial decline in the e±ciency of unskilled labor, implying that
the decline in unskilled labor e±ciency has signi¯cantly contributed to the widening in
the U.S. wage structure. In a standard growth accounting framework, these ¯ndings
further imply that skilled labor e±ciency growth accounts for 35 to 67 percent of output
growth, while changes in unskilled labor e±ciency account for -31 to 2 percent of output
growth, depending on exact values of the parameters of the model and the de¯nition of
skilled labor.
JEL Classi¯cation: E1, O3 and O4
Keywords: Economic Growth, Growth Accounting, Skilled (Unskilled) Labor E±-
ciency
¤B. Unel: Department of Economics, Louisiana State University; Baton Rouge, LA 70803; e-mail:
bunel@lsu.edu. I am indebted to Areendam Chanda, Doug McMillin, and David Weil for their comments
and help. I thank seminar participants at LSU and SEA 2007 conference. Finally, I want to thank Melissa
Kearney for help with data.1
1 Introduction
Figure 1 plots the U.S. relative supply of skills vs. the skill premium, de¯ned as (hourly)
wage of skilled labor relative to that of unskilled labor, between 1961 and 2005. It shows
that the relative supply of skills and the skill premium have changed dramatically. Although
the relative supply of skills has increased substantially, there is no tendency for the skill
premium to decline. Indeed, there has been a substantial increase in the skill premium since
1980 (Bound and Johnson (2000), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Autor et al. (2007)). This
pattern underlines the common view that new technologies have been skilled biased (Bound
and Johnson (2000), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Acemoglu (1998) and (2002)). Another
interesting point in this ¯gure is that the relative supply of skilled labor has increased
rapidly since the late 1960s, and the skill premium has grown signi¯cantly since the early
1980s, which has led many economists to conclude that there has been an acceleration in
skilled biased technical change (Autor et al. (1998) and Acemoglu (1998) and (2002)).
Naturally, one may wonder how the technologies that augment skilled and unskilled
labors have evolved over this period. This is the question that we would like to address
in this paper. In particular, we analyze the time paths of skilled and unskilled augmented
technologies and their e®ects on the U.S. skill premium and economic growth during the
period 1961-2005. Toward this end, we extend the standard two-factor production function
to a three-factor production function with capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor by
relaxing the assumption that the two types of labor are perfect substitutes. Assuming that
markets are competitive and parameters of the model are known, we can derive the time
series of the skilled and unskilled augmented technologies from the data. We then use these
series to address their implications for the skilled premium and economic growth. Given
that this production structure ignores some other factors that may a®ect the production,
it is important to note that these technologies are imperfectly measured as the e±ciency of
labor (or labor e±ciency).












































Figure 1. Relative Supply of Skills vs. Skill Premium This ¯gure represents the U.S.
relative supply of skills vs. the skill premium. Initial values are normalized to 1.
the claim that there has been an acceleration in the skilled biased technical change. Indeed,
we ¯nd skilled labor e±ciency grew more slowly after 1973. More interestingly, we ¯nd
that beginning in the early 1970s (around 1973), there has been a substantial decline in the
absolute level of the e±ciency of unskilled labor. These results have interesting implications.
First, they imply that the substantial widening in the U.S. wage structure has not only been
driven by increases in skilled labor e±ciency, but also by substantial declines in the e±ciency
of unskilled labor. For example, if after 1973 unskilled labor e±ciency growth had slowed
by the same proportion as that of skilled labor e±ciency, the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled workers would be about 25 to 30% lower in 2005. Second, the decline in
unskilled labor augmented e±ciency also has an adverse e®ect on output growth. Using a
standard growth accounting framework, we show that skilled labor e±ciency accounts for
between 1.2 and 2.2 percentage points (or 35 to 67 percent) of output growth, while changes
in unskilled labor e±ciency accounts for between -1 and 0.05 percentage points (or -31 to3
2 percent) of output growth. The total contribution of other factors to output growth is
about 2 percentage points, accounting for 63 percent of growth. Thus, as in the above case,
if after 1973 the growth rate of unskilled labor e±ciency had slowed by the same proportion
as that of skilled labor e±ciency, GDP (and per capita GDP) would be about 20 to 40
percent higher in 2005. Finally, the signi¯cant decline of unskilled labor e±ciency during
the post 1973 period contradicts the common view that the U.S. economy has been on a
balanced growth path.
This paper methodologically builds on Caselli and Coleman (2006), who study cross-
country di®erences in the aggregate production function when skilled and unskilled labor
are imperfect substitutes. They ¯nd that higher-income countries use skilled labor more e±-
ciently than lower-income countries, while they use unskilled labor relatively less e±ciently.
We use the same methodology to shed light on the question of how the U.S. economy has
utilized skilled and unskilled labor over the last 45 years. Our analysis, however, reveals
that the e±ciency of unskilled labor is not monotonically declining with the increase in
income levels.
This paper is related to two literatures: wage inequality and growth accounting. The
studies in the wage inequality literature typically address the determinants of the dramatic
changes in the U.S. skill premium (see, Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell et al. (2000), and
Autor et al. (2007), among many others). An interesting contribution to this literature
is Ruiz-Arranz (2004), who uses a translog production approach to study the sources of
changes in the U.S. skill premium. She ¯nds that skilled labor technical innovations and
the decline in the absolute e±ciency of unskilled labor are the main factors responsible for
the substantial rise in the skill premium. Although her ¯ndings are similar to ours, there
are still di®erences between the two papers. First, methodologically the two papers are
di®erent. She estimates a translog production model, and using the estimated parameters,
determines the nature of technical change. In contrast, we do not estimate any model.
Instead, using a few assumptions, we derive the time series of skilled and unskilled labor4
e±ciencies from the data and our approach allows us to examine the time behavior of the
e±ciency series more directly and clearly than hers. For example, we ¯nd that the e±ciency
of unskilled labor has not always been declining. Second, our analysis also investigates the
e®ects of changes in the e±ciencies on output growth.1
There is now an in°uential literature on accounting for the sources of growth in the U.S.
economy.2 Our approach is in the same spirit as the in°uential work by Solow (1957).3 The
most relevant study to our work is Jones (2002), who based on a Cobb-Douglas production
function, ¯nds that total factor productivity (TFP) is the largest contributor to US output
growth during the period 1950-1993. Jones also notices that increases in educational attain-
ment and research intensity during the last several decades imply that the U.S. economy is
far from its balanced growth path. To reconcile these facts with the steady growth in output
per hour worked, he argues that the U.S. economy has been on a constant growth path,
along which variables also have constant growth rates. Although within the Cobb-Douglas
framework the constant growth path explanation is plausible, it is not convincing when we
assume skilled and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes. In particular, our analysis
reveals that the time path of the e±ciency of unskilled labor does not follow a constant
growth path (for a more detailed explanation, see section 3.4).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the production
framework that underlies our analysis. Section 3 presents the quantitative analysis. In this
section, we ¯rst discusses the main features of the data along with the construction of the
1On the other hand, she considers a four-factor production function with di®erent elasticities of substi-
tution between the two of types of capital and the two types of labor, whereas we do not. Extending our
analysis to a more general production function with di®erent types of capital requires calibrations of more
parameters. Such an extension is left for future work.
2See Solow (1957), Denison (1962), Jorgenson (1967), and Jorgenson (2005). In particular, see Jorgenson
(2005) for a summary of works in this literature.
3There are two approaches in this literature. The ¯rst one originally developed by Solow (1957) is the
aggregate production function approach, which is the one that we also use in this paper. The alternative one
is known as production possibility approach originally developed by Jorgenson (1966) and recently employed
by Jorgenson (2005) and Jorgenson et al. (2007). Although this approach imposes less restrictions on value-
added functions, it only delivers a TFP growth rate. Since we are interested in analyzing the e±ciencies of
skilled and unskilled labor, this second approach is not appropriate for our analysis.5
key variables. Then we introduce the main results and their interpretations. Finally, we
perform some sensitivity analysis and compare results to previous work. Section 4 o®ers
some concluding remarks.
2 Modeling Production Possibility
We consider a production function with capital, di®erent types of labor, and di®erent types
of technical progress. We assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas over capital,
and a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of the other inputs in the following
way:
Y (t) = K(t)® [(As(t)Ls(t))½ + (Au(t)Lu(t))½]
1¡®
½ ; (1)
where Y is output, K is the capital stock, and Ls (Lu) is skilled (unskilled) labor. As (Au)
represents skilled (unskilled) labor augmented technical change, and ½ is a time invariant
production parameter. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labors
is given by ¾ = 1=(1 ¡ ½):
We assume that factor markets are competitive so that each factor earns its marginal
product. The ¯rst order conditions yield the following relationship between the skill pre-














where wi is the wage rate of i-type labor. This equation tells us that the relative wage,
ws=wu; is decreasing in the relative supply of skill, Ls=Lu: The e®ect of As=Au; however,
depends on ¾: If ¾ > 1; then an increase in As increases the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled labor. This further implies that skilled augmented technical change is also
skilled-biased. On the other hand, when ¾ < 1; an increase in As reduces the relative wage,
which in turn implies that the skilled augmented technical change is unskilled-biased.
















Thus, with the data on output, factor inputs, and factor prices, we can back out As and
Au from equation (3). Then As and Au can be used in an accounting framework to assess
their importance to income di®erences over time. Toward this goal, consider equation (1):
taking the logarithm of both sides and di®erentiating with respect to time yields
gY = "KgK + "LsgLs + "LugLu + "AsgAs + "AugAu;
where gx represents the growth rate of variable x and "x = (@Y=@x)(x=Y ) is the elasticity
of x with respect to output Y: It is easy to show that "K = ® and "Li = "Ai = (1 ¡ ®)¯i:






gK=Y + ¯sgLs + ¯ugLu + ¯sgAs + ¯ugAu; (4)
where the ¯rst term denotes the growth rate of K=Y:
Equation (4) decomposes output into several components that have speci¯c interpre-
tations. The ¯rst term, gK=Y ; measures the contribution of capital deepening to output
growth. The sum ¯sgLs + ¯ugLu represents the total contribution of changes in labor in-
puts to output growth. Two ¯nals terms, ¯sgAs and ¯ugAu; measure the contributions
of skilled and unskilled augmented technical change to output growth. The discrete time





b Kt ¡ b Yt
´
+ ¹ ¯s;tb Ls;t + ¹ ¯u;tb Lu;t + ¹ ¯s;t b As;t + ¹ ¯u;t b Au;t; (5)
where b Xt = lnXt ¡ lnXt¡1 represents the growth rate of variable X in year t; and ¹ ¯it =
0:5(¯i;t¡1 + ¯i;t): This equation will be the basis of our accounting exercise.7
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we apply the key results presented in the previous section to investigate
the e®ects of skilled and unskilled labor augmented TFPs on the skilled premium and
economic growth in the United States between 1961 and 2005. First, however, we start
with construction of key variables used in the model.
3.1 The Data
The data on output and capital are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
GDP and capital series are chained in 2000 chain-dollars. The key point in this exercise is
the construction of the skilled and unskilled labor input and wages. The sources of labor
input data are from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1962 to 2006. Since
wages and labor input data in the survey refer to one year earlier, our sample spans the
period 1961-2005. We consider all employed people between 16 and 70 years old, excluding
the self-employed workers. The appendix provides a complete description of the data sets.
Construction of the series for skilled and unskilled labor is accomplished in two steps.
In the ¯rst step, following Krusell et al. (2000), we constructed more than two-hundred
demographic groups and calculated their average wages using CPS sampling weights. In the
second, we sort these groups into skilled and unskilled labor. We then aggregate variables
across groups to obtain category-speci¯c averages.
Following Krusell et al. (2000), in each year we divide the data into distinct labor
groups characterized by age, race, sex, and years of education. Age is divided into 11 ¯ve-
year groups; there are three races (white, black, and others), and two sexes. Education
status, E; is divided into 4 groups: E < 12 (no high school diploma), E = 12 (high school
graduate), 13 · E · 15 (some college), and E ¸ 16 (college graduate or more) to depict
years of schooling.
This taxonomy generates a partition of the population into 264 distinct groups, and we
shall denote each group by °: Each worker is assigned to one of these groups, and for each8
group, we construct measures of the labor input and the labor earnings using CPS sampling
weights. Total hours worked for group ° in year t is given by
P
i2° hrit¹it; where i indexes
for individual, hr is annual hours worked, and ¹ is the CPS sample weight.4 Similarly,
the corresponding total income (from wage and salaries) is given by
P
i2° Wit¹it; where
Wit is individual i's total annual income in year t: The average hourly wage for group ° is





Crucial to our analysis is the aggregation of labor inputs into skilled and unskilled classes.
Groups within a class are assumed to be perfect substitutes, and following standard practice
in this literature, we use group relative wages as weights for the aggregation. The basic idea
is based on the assumption that relative wages equal relative human capital. Thus labor
input is human capital adjusted.5 For each group in each year, we construct a relative wage
measure by dividing each group's average hourly wage by the average hourly wage of the
group which contains white males, who are between 16-20 ages, and have less than 12 years
of schooling in the contemporaneous year.6 The relative human capital index measure for
each group, h°; is computed as the arithmetic mean of the relative wage measures in that
group over 1961 to 2005.
We aggregate the set of 264 groups into skilled and unskilled classes. Following Krusell
et al. (2000), we assume that everyone who has at least 16 years of schooling is skilled, and
those who have not are unskilled. In robustness section, we shall consider an alternative
classi¯cation in which skilled labor class consists of college or college-plus workers and half
4As emphasized by Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2007), the March CPS data are not ideal for
analyzing the hourly wage distribution since they lack a point-in-time wage measure. Hourly wages are
calculated by dividing annual earnings by the product of weeks worked last year and hours worked the week
before the survey. Estimates of hours worked last week from the CPS appear to be noisy and data on usual
weekly hours last year are not available prior to the 1976 March CPS. For this reason, we also considered
an analysis based on weekly wages. But quite interestingly, that analysis yielded very similar results to that
obtained using hourly wages. Results are available upon request to the author.
5Labor input is usually called e±ciency-adjusted labor, instead of human capital adjusted labor (e.g.
Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor et al. (2007)). However, in this paper e±ciency refers to the measured
values of As and Au:
6This choice of the base group is innocuous. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) index each group's
wage to the wages for a ¯xed bundle of workers.9
of the workers with some college; and unskilled labor class consists of high school dropouts,
high school graduates, and half of the workers with some college (Card and Limeoux (2001)
and Autor et al. (2007)). But results qualitatively remain mostly the same.
Let ¡s (¡u) denote the set of skilled (unskilled) groups. Then the total human capital
adjusted labor input in each class is given by Ljt =
P
°2¡j h°`°t: Now with the data on
total wages and labor inputs, the average hourly wage of j-class labor is given by wjt =
P
°2¡j w°t`°t=Ljt; as in Krusell et al. (2000). Figure 1 (in the introduction) plots the relative
supply of skills and the skill premium between 1961 and 2005. The pattern presented in this
¯gure is very similar to that in previous studies such as Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell
et al. (2000), and in particular, Autor et al. (2007) who consider a more comparable period
of time (1963-2005).7
To construct the As; Au; and As=Au series, we need to know two parameters{ ® and
¾: The parameter ® measures the capital share and we set it to 1/3, which matches the
U.S. historical values for this variable. The parameter ¾; on the other hand, represents
the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and there is now a large
labor-economics literature focused on its estimate. The most in°uential study is Katz and
Murphy (1992), whose estimate, based on the CPS data over the period 1963-87, is about
1.4. Autor et al. (2007) extend the period to 2005, and they ¯nd that it is about 1.6. Using
a dynamic general equilibrium model, Heckman et al. (1998) estimate that it is about 1.5.
Using a state-level panel data, Ciccone and Peri (2005) ¯nd that the long-run elasticity
of substitution between more and less educated workers to be around 1.5. Indeed, based
on various econometric estimates, Autor et al. (1998) conclude that this elasticity is very
unlikely to be greater than 2. Our preferred value for ¾ is 1.5; but we shall also report
results with ¾ = 1:75; and ¾ = 2:
7The minor di®erences between Figure 1 and Figure 2.A in Autor et al. (2007) stem from three facts.
First, they consider only people between 18 and 64 years old. Second, their sample includes only full-time,
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Figure 2. Time Path of lnAs=Au: This ¯gure represents the time path of lnAs=Au under
di®erent values for substitution elasticity between skilled and unskilled labor. Initial values are
normalized to 1.
3.2 Main Results
Figure 2 plots time paths of log As=Au based on equation (2). The growth rate of As=Au
has been surprisingly stable over the last 45 years: the average annual growth rate is about
7.0% for ¾ = 1:5; 4.9% for ¾ = 1:75; and 3.8% for ¾ = 2:0: This ¯gure basically contradicts
the common view that there has been an acceleration in skill biased technical change. A
natural question arises at this point. How have As and Au changed over this period? Has
there really been any signi¯cant acceleration in As? If yes, when did it happen? What
happened to Au; when As accelerated?
Figures 3.a and 3.b plot the corresponding log time paths of As and Au; respectively.
There are several interesting things to note in these ¯gures. First, although there is an
increase in skill premium since the late 1970s, we do not see any upward trend in lnAs:
Indeed, if we carefully look at the ¯gure, there is a productivity slow down beginning in
the early 1970s (around 1973). For example, with ¾ = 1:5; the average annual growth rate11
of As between 1961 and 1973 is about 7.9%, while it is 5.3% between 1973 and 2005. This
basically reinforces our above observation that there has been no accelerations in skilled-
biased technical change.
Second, beginning in the early 1970s, the e±ciency of unskilled labor decreased sub-
stantially and the magnitude of decline is more signi¯cant when elasticity of substitution is
small. Again, with ¾ = 1:5; the average annual growth rate of Au between 1961 and 1973 is
about 1.2%, while it is -1.8% between 1973 and 2005. If there were no decline in Au; As=Au
would grow more slowly in the post 1973 period.
Third, time paths of Au also contradict the common view that the U.S. economy has
been on its long-run balanced growth path. This common view is based on the stylized
facts that over the last 100 years, the average growth rate of per capita income has been
remarkably stable and there are no trends in the U.S. capital output-ratio and the real
interest rates (as ¯rst noticed by Kaldor (1961)). The non-monotonic time path of Au;
however, suggests that the US economy has not been on a balanced growth path. This
conclusion is in line with Jones (2002), who notices that rising educational attainment and
research intensity during the last several decades implies that the U.S. economy is far from
its balanced growth path.
What caused the e±ciency performance of skilled and unskilled labor to deteriorate
after 1973? Clearly accelerated skill-biased technology explanation is not convincing. In an
interesting article, titled 1974, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) argue that the slowdown
in productivity after 1973 may have resulted from the information technology (IT) revolu-
tion. In particular, they argue that new ITs required a substantial period of learning by
workers who would work with the technology: during this learning process, productivity
was depressed as labor adapted to more powerful new technologies. This argument has two
important implications which are also, to some extent, consistent with the pattern presented
in Figure 3. First, the new technologies would adversely a®ect both skilled and unskilled
labor productivity. Given that unskilled labor is not equipped with necessary training to12








1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
s=1.50 s=1.75 s=2.00







1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
s=1.50 s=1.75 s=2.00
Figure 3. Time Paths of lnAs and lnAu:These ¯gures represent the time paths of the
e±ciencies of skilled and unskilled labor under di®erent values for substitution elasticity between
skilled and unskilled labor. Initial values are normalized to 1.13
use the new technologies, their productivity might even decline upon implementing them.
Second, over the time when workers are used to working with the new technologies, we
should see a productivity surge. Indeed, in the late 1990s, skilled labor productivity grew
relatively more rapidly than it had for the preceding 20 years. But it is still puzzling that
there has been no surge in the e±ciency of unskilled labor.
Before turning to the growth accounting exercise, it will be interesting to investigate
implications of the above trends for the skill premium. Towards this end, we reconsider
equation (2). Taking the logarithm of both sides, di®erentiating with respect to time, and
rearranging the terms yields









where gx denotes the growth rate of variable x:
Obviously, if the e±ciency of unskilled labor, Au; had a positive growth rate between
1973 and 2005, the gap between skilled and unskilled labor wage rates would be lower. Now
we would like to address the following question: instead of declining so rapidly after 1973,
if Au had grown more slowly, as that of As; how much lower would the skill premium be
in 2005? We note that under ¾ = 1:5; the average growth rate of As after 1973 is about
33% lower than that in 1961-73 period. If Au growth declined by the same proportion, its
annual growth rate would be 0.8% (instead of -1.8%) during the period 1973-2005. In this
case, the average annual growth rate of the skill premium, gws ¡gwu; would be 0.27% lower,
which in turn implies that the skill premium would be about 25% lower in 2005. Following
the same steps under ¾ = 1:75 and ¾ = 2:0; we ¯nd similar results, i.e. the skill premium
would be about 25% lower in 2005.8
We now turn to our accounting exercises. Table 1 reports the growth accounting exercise
based on equation (5). According to this table, the contribution of factor inputs to output
8With ¾ = 1:75 (¾ = 2:0); the average growth rate of Au during 1961-1973 is about 1.66% (1.88%), while
it is about -1.10%(-0.73%) between 1973 and 2005. The average growth rates of As; on the other hand, are
6.3% (5.5%) during 1961-73, and 3.9% (3.2%) during 1973-2005.14
Table 1: Accounting For US Growth, 1961-2005
Contribution of
Capital Skilled Unskilled S-Labor U-Labor
Elasticity Output Intensity Labor Labor E±ciency E±ciency
¾ ^ Y ®
1¡®( ^ K ¡ ^ Y ) ¹ ¯s^ Ls ¹ ¯u^ Lu ¹ ¯s ^ As ¹ ¯u ^ Au
1.50 0:033 -0.001 0.012 0.010 0.018 -0.006
(100) (-4) (36) (31) (55) (-18)
1.75 0:033 -0.001 0.012 0.010 0.015 -0.002
(100) (-4) (36) (31) (41) (-5)
2.00 0:033 -0.001 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.000
(100) (-4) (36) (31) (35) (2)
Notes: This table reports the growth accounting decomposition based on equation (5). The
speci¯cations are sorted according to the value for ¾: Numbers in parentheses represent relative
contributions in percentage. S-Labor (U-Labor) e±ciency represent the e±ciency of skilled
(unskilled) labor.
growth is about 63 percent. The remaining 37 percent of growth is attributed to changes in
e±ciencies. This e®ect itself is the sum of two components. First, growth in the e±ciency
of skilled labor is one of the largest contributors to output growth in this decomposition,
accounting for between 35 to 55 percent of output growth, depending on exact value of the
elasticity of substitution ¾: Second, changes in the e±ciency of unskilled labor accounts for
between 2 to -18 percent of output growth, depending on the exact value of ¾:
As in the above case, what output level would we observe in 2005, if the growth rate of
Au had declined by the same proportion as that of As after 1973? From the above analysis,
we know that under ¾ = 1:5 such slow down would imply a 0.82 percent average annual
growth rate for Au: Using this counterfactual time trend in equation (1) implies that the
output would be about 38 percent higher in 2005. Under ¾ = 1:75 and ¾ = 2:0, however,
the output level would be about 29 (25) percent higher in 2005.15
3.3 Analysis with Di®erent De¯nition of Skilled Labor
Analysis presented in the previous section is based on a college-completed de¯nition of
skilled. In this section, we consider an alternative classi¯cation used by Card and Limeoux
(2001), Autor et al. (2007), and others in which the skilled labor class consists of college or
college-plus workers and half of the workers with some college and the unskilled labor class
consists of high school dropouts, high school graduates, and half of the workers with some
college.
Figures 4.a and 4.b plot the time paths of lnAs and lnAu; respectively.9 These plots
are very similar to that in Figure 3, except decline in Au is more signi¯cant in Figure 4.b.
Moreover, compared to time path of Au in Figure 3.b, Au grows more slowly between 1961
and 1973. For example, with ¾ = 1:5 the average annual growth rates of Au over two periods
(1961-1973 and 1973-2005) are 0.7 and -2.9 percents, respectively; whereas they were 1.2
and -1.8 percents in Figure 3.b.
Table 2 reports the growth accounting exercise. Contribution of factor inputs to output
growth is about 2 percentage points; while the remaining 1.3 percentage of contribution to
out growth is attributed to changes in e±ciencies. Growth in the e±ciency of skilled labor
is usually the largest contributor to output growth in this decomposition, accounting for
between 43 to 67 percent of output growth, depending on the exact value of the elasticity
of substitution ¾: Note that although the contribution of each factor to output growth is
di®erent than that in Table 1, the relative contribution of factor inputs vs. total e±ciency
is the same as in Table 1: factor inputs account for about 63 percent of output growth.
We can also perform similar counterfactual exercises as we did in the previous section.
We want to address the question of how much the skill premium and output would be
di®erent in 2005, if the e±ciency of unskilled labor, Au; had grown more slowly, as that
of the e±ciency of skilled labor, in the post 1973 period. We ¯nd that the skill premium
9For the sake of brevity, we don't report counterparts of Figures 1 and 2. The overall pattern is very
similar and they are available upon request.16
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Figure 4. Time Paths of lnAs and lnAu:These ¯gures represent the time paths of skilled
and unskilled labor e±ciencies based on a di®erent de¯nition of skilled. Initial values are normalized
to 1.17
Table 2: Accounting For US Growth, 1961-2005
Contribution of
Capital Skilled Unskilled S-Labor U-Labor
Elasticity Output Intensity Labor Labor E±ciency E±ciency
¾ ^ Y ®
1¡®( ^ K ¡ ^ Y ) ¹ ¯s^ Ls ¹ ¯u^ Lu ¹ ¯s ^ As ¹ ¯u ^ Au
1.50 0:033 -0.001 0.016 0.006 0.022 -0.010
(100) (-4) (48) (19) (67) (-31)
1.75 0:033 -0.001 0.016 0.006 0.017 -0.005
(100) (-4) (48) (19) (55) (-15)
2.00 0:033 -0.001 0.016 0.006 0.014 -0.002
(100) (-4) (48) (19) (43) (-6)
Notes: This table reports the growth accounting decomposition based on equation (5). The
speci¯cations are sorted according to the value for ¾: Numbers in parentheses represent relative
contributions in percentage. S-Labor (U-Labor) e±ciency represent the e±ciency of skilled
(unskilled) labor.
would be about 30 percent lower in 2005, while GDP (and per capita GDP) would be 23 to
38 percent higher in 2005.
3.4 Comparison to Cobb-Douglas Speci¯cation
In this section we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function in which skilled and un-
skilled labor are perfect substitutes:
Y (t) = K(t)®(A(t)L(t))1¡®;
where A denotes the TFP and L is the labor input (L(t) = Ls(t) + Lu(t)). Like in the
previous sections, the labor input is measured in e±ciency units, i.e. L(t) = h(t)N(t);
where h is the average human capital index and N is the total raw labor measured in hours.
The Cobb-Douglas production function has been widely used in the growth accounting
literature and has recently been used by Jones (2002) to assess the sources of economic
growth in the U.S. economy.18
Table 3: Accounting For US Growth, 1961-2005
Contribution of
Output Capital Human Labor
Output per Hour Intensity Capital Hours TFP
^ Y ^ y ®
1¡®( ^ K ¡ ^ Y ) ^ h ^ N ^ A
3.30 -0.001 0.003 0.019 0.012
(100) (-4) (10) (58) (36)
0.014 -0.001 0.003 0.012
(100) (-9) (24) (85)
Notes: This table reports the growth accounting decomposition based on equations (6.a) and (6.b).
Numbers in parentheses represent relative contributions in percentage.
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where ^ X represents the average growth rate of variable X between 1961 and 2005. By





^ K ¡ ^ Y
´
+ ^ h + ^ A; (6:b)
where ^ y = ^ Y ¡ ^ N denotes average growth rate of output per hour. This form is useful when
we compare our results to that in Jones (2002).
Table 3 represents the accounting results based on equations (6.a) and (6.b). The total
contribution of factor inputs to output growth is about 2.1 percentage points, accounting for
about 64 percent of output growth. The remaining 36 percent contribution comes from TFP
growth. From this perspective, the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation delivers the same results as
that obtained under the CES speci¯cation. However, there are two problems with the
Cobb-Douglas approach. First, it assumes that skilled and unskilled labors are perfectly
substitutable, i.e. the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is19
in¯nity. However, as we emphasized before, the empirical labor literature documents that
it is around 1.5, well below in¯nity. Second, this approach does not allow us to separate
the contribution of skilled and unskilled labor inputs and the corresponding e±ciencies to
output growth.
Results in the last two rows of Table 3 are di®erent from those in Table 2 in Jones (2002)
and this stems from the di®erences in time periods analyzed in both periods, construction of
variables, and data sources on labor inputs.10 Furthermore, Jones considers human capital
based on years of schooling, whereas we construct human capital index based on relative
wages. Jones ¯nds that the contribution of human capital to the growth of output per hour
is about 30 percent and the remaining 70 percent of growth is attributed to a rise in TFP.
Although this distribution is di®erent than that in Table 3, both papers ¯nd that growth
in total e±ciency is the single largest contributor to growth in this decomposition.
Jones (2002) uses an endogenous growth model to show that more than 80 percent of the
growth in the US from 1950 to 1993 is attributed to the transitional dynamics associated
with educational attainment and the stock of ideas. Using the same steps, we can show
that this conclusion remains mostly the same in our sample too. Thus, as Jones notices,
this contradicts the conventional wisdom that the U.S. economy is on a balanced growth
path. To reconcile this with stable growth in output per hour, Jones proposes the constant
growth path hypothesis in which all growth rates are constant.11 In particular, he assumes
that the capital stock, K; and the stock of ideas, A (measured by TFP), grow at constant
rates. Although there is a slowdown in the growth of A after 1973, assuming that K and
A grow at constant rates are not implausible as a ¯rst approximation and our data also
10For example, Jones ¯nds that average growth rate of output per hour is 2 percent between 1950 and
1993, and ours is considerably lower than that. The main reason for this di®erence is the growth in labor
input in both studies. Jones assumes a constant year of 50 weeks. In our sample, however, we ¯nd a
signi¯cant variation in the number of weeks worked across groups and the average annual growth rate of
the average number of weeks is about 0.2 percent over the sample period. Furthermore, in our sample the
average weekly hours remain mostly constant, whereas in Jones' data it declines about 0.3 percent each year.
The average weekly hours data in Jones (2002) represents the average hours of production workers for total
private industry from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
11The constant growth path is di®erent from balanced growth path in that it is not required that the
economy will stay on this path forever.20
support this.12
Following the same steps in Jones (2002), it can be shown that accounting results based
on the constant growth path hypothesis delivers similar results that in Table 3, con¯rming
that the constant growth path hypothesis is a reasonable approximation. One may worry
whether this hypothesis is applicable when we consider an alternative production function.
Our analysis in previous sections shows that this approach does not work under the CES
production function. In particular, the time path of Au is far from a constant growth path.
4 Concluding Remarks
Beginning in the late 1960s, the relative supply of skilled labor has increased more rapidly
than before, and the skilled wage premium has increased sharply since 1980. Many economists
argue that this pattern is resulted from the acceleration of skilled biased technical change.
In this paper, using a production framework in which skilled and unskilled labor are im-
perfect substitutes, we analyze the time paths of skilled and unskilled labor augmneted
e±ciencies and investigate their implications for wage inequality and economic growth.
We ¯nd a slowdown in skilled labor augmented e±ciency growth after 1973, and a
substantial decline in the absolute level of the e±ciency of unskilled labor since then. These
basically imply that the dramatic rise in the U.S. skill premium over the last two decades has
not only been driven by increases in the skilled labor e±ciency, but also substantial declines
in unskilled labor e±ciency. Using these in a growth accounting exercise implies that skilled
labor augmented e±ciencies growth accounts for 38 to 72 percent of output growth, while
the unskilled labor TFP growth accounts for -33 to 2 percent of output growth. The total
contribution of other factors to output growth is about 2 percentage points, accounting for
60 percent of growth.
There are two main directions that the present work can be extended. First, extending
the analysis to a panel of countries will be an interesting exercise. As indicated in the in-
12The growth rate of K has been remarkably constant at 3.1 percent and its constancy can be discerned
from the negligible contribution of K=Y to output growth.21
troduction, Caselli and Coleman (2006) ¯nd that higher-income countries use skilled labor
more e±ciently than lower-income countries, while they use unskilled labor relatively less
e±ciently. We, on the other hand, ¯nd that the e±ciency of unskilled labor is not mono-
tonically declining with an increase in income levels. These ¯ndings suggest that extending
this work to a panel of countries can uncover several interesting facts about direction of
technical changes across countries.
Supply and wage dynamics at sectoral level have been quite dramatic. For example,
Autor and Dorn (2007) show that employment in low-skill service jobs expanded persistently
and rapidly between 1980 and 2005, with modest gains in real wages. This contradicts the
general trends of employment and earnings of low-skill workers in other sectors in US.
Reshef (2007), on the other hand, shows that in the growing skill intensive services sector
technical progress has been unskilled biased; while in the unskilled intensive goods sector,
technical progress has been skilled biased. Thus, extending the current analysis to a more
disaggregated level will shed more light on how di®erent sectors in US have utilized skilled
and unskilled labor.
A Data Appendix
Data on output and capital is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and they
are measured in 2000-chained prices. The sources of labor input data are from the March
Current Population Surveys (CPS), covering 1962 to 2006, which are obtained from Unicon
Research Corporation. The main advantage of using the CPS data from Unicon is that
Unicon has cleaned up the all problems in the raw CPS ¯les provided by Census Bureau and
recoded variables so that the surveys became more comparable across years. It also provides
extensive documentation about variables, which are especially useful in construction of more
aggregated variables.
We consider all employed people between 16 and 70 years old, excluding self-employed
workers. The sample does not include allocated earnings observations due to the fact that22
the imputation procedures changed between 1975 and 1976. To exclude imputed wages,
family earnings allocation °ags (1966-1975) and individual earnings allocation °ags (1976
onward) are used.
Two adjustments for topcoded earnings are also made. First, following Autor et al.
(2007) income of workers with top coded earnings are imputed by multiplying the annual
topcode amount by 1.5. Second, starting in 1996, topcoded earnings values are assigned
the mean of all topcoded earners. In these cases, we simply reassign the topcoded values
to all observations and again multiply by 1.5.13 Earnings are de°ated using the Personal
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) de°ator from BEA. Earnings of below $112 per week (in
2000 dollars) are dropped, following Autor et al. (2007).
As indicated in the main text, in each year we divide the data into 264 groups charac-
terized by age, race, sex, and years of education. Commencing in 1992, the Bureau of the
Census changed emphasis of its educational attainment question from years of education to
degree receipt. To obtain a comparable educational-attainment data across years, we follow
the classi¯cation proposed by Jaeger (1997). Speci¯cally, we de¯ne high school dropouts
as those with fewer than 12 years of schooling; high school graduates as those with either
12 years of education and/or a high school diploma; some college as those attending some
college or holding an associate's degree; and college plus as those with a bachelor's degree
or higher.
Weekly wages are formed by dividing annual incomes by imputed measures of weeks
worked during the previous year. We use an imputed measure of worked since the exact
number of weeks worked is not available in the CPS prior to 1976. Following Card and
Lemieux (2001), we assign 10 for 1-13 weeks category, 22 for 14-26 weeks category, 35 for
27-39 weeks category, 45 for 40-47 weeks category, 48.5 for 48-49 weeks category, 52 for
50-52 weeks category.
13Unassigned topcoded values are available in the surveys. For example, for the secondary earning value,
the topcoded maximum is set at 99,999 from 1988 to 1995, falls to 25,000 for 1996 through 2002, and rises
to 35,000 in 2003 through 2006.23
Similarly, hourly wages are formed by dividing annual incomes by imputed measures of
hours worked during the previous year. Imputed hours are formed by multiplying imputed
weeks by hours worked last week. We use hours worked last week since the data on hours
worked last year are not available in the CPS prior to 1976. In computing the group labor
hour, we also consider the those workers who reported zero hours worked last week. We
assume that their weekly supply of hours is equal to that of the average worker with nonzero
hours worked belonging to the same group. In all such calculations we use CPS weights.
Some individuals reported zero incomes. We also consider all such individuals by im-
puting their wages from the data as follows. We divide the data into 40 groups charac-
terized by sex, education, and experience, where we de¯ne years of potential experience
as Minfage ¡ years of schooling ¡ 7;age ¡ 17g (Katz and Murphy (1992)). Log weekly
wages are regressed in each year separately by sex on the dummy variables for educational
categories, 3 region dummies, black and other race dummies, and a quartic experience as
in Autor et al. (2007). We use estimated wages for those who reported zero income.
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